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After Life: Governmental Interests and 
the New Antiabortion Incrementalism 
MARY ZIEGLER* 
In the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, commentators have 
focused on the effect of antiabortion restrictions. But as this 
Article shows, Whole Woman’s Health is part of the story of 
an equally important tactic used by those chipping away at 
abortion rights: the recognition of new governmental inter-
ests justifying abortion regulations. Using original archival 
research, this Article traces the rise of this strategy and doc-
uments its influence on Supreme Court doctrine, making 
sense of what seem to be contradictory rulings on abortion.  
How should courts deal with novel legislative purposes 
or broader interpretations of existing ones? The Court’s re-
cent decision in Whole Woman’s Health clarified that courts 
must weigh the degree to which a statute delivers on the ben-
efits it promises, but the Court raised as many questions as 
it answered. To better ground judicial analysis of govern-
mental interests, this Article proposes a two-step approach. 
As an initial matter, states should have to articulate a 
claimed purpose with enough specificity that would enable 
courts to measure whether a law is succeeding. Then, in 
evaluating whether a law advances its stated goal, a court 
should consider: (1) whether a law addresses a measurable 
problem; (2) whether the law improves on the results 
achieved by previous policies; and (3) whether the law has 
some quantifiable (if not numerically specific) benefit. Cre-
ating a framework with which to analyze any new purposes 
proposed by states to justify abortion regulations will pro-
vide more consistency, clarity, and coherence for 
                                                                                                         
 *  Mary Ziegler is the Stearns Weaver Miller Professor at Florida State Uni-
versity College of Law. She would like to thank Albertina Antognini, Aziza Ah-
med, Courtney Cahill, April Cherry, Meredith Harbach, Kim Mutcherson, Noya 
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legislatures and lower courts. The approach suggested in 
this Article will help ensure that the Court preserves the bal-
ance crafted by Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey and Whole Woman’s Health. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Those studying the abortion wars have focused on the effect of 
antiabortion restrictions. 1  However, as this Article shows, the 
Court’s recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt2 is 
part of the story of an equally important tactic used by those chip-
ping away at abortion rights: creating new governmental interests to 
                                                                                                         
 1  See, e.g., Andrea D. Friedman, Bad Medicine: Abortion and the Battle 
Over Who Speaks for Women’s Health, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 51–52 
(2013); Dawn Johnsen, “TRAP”ing Roe in Indiana and a Common-Ground Al-
ternative, 118 YALE L.J. 1356, 1359 (2009); Mary Ziegler, Substantial Uncer-
tainty: Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and the Future of Abortion Law, 
2016 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 85–90 (2016). 
 2  136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
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justify abortion regulations and expanding those interests that the 
Court has already dignified. Using original archival research, this 
Article traces the rise of this strategy and documents its influence on 
Supreme Court doctrine, making sense of what seem to be contra-
dictory rulings on abortion. Major cases in this area often turn at 
least partly on whether the Court will dignify a new governmental 
justification for restricting abortion.3  
How should courts deal with novel legislative purposes or 
broader interpretations of existing ones? The Court’s recent decision 
in Whole Woman’s Health clarified that courts must weigh the de-
gree to which a statute delivers on the benefits it promises, but the 
Court raised as many questions as it answered.4 To better ground 
judicial analysis of governmental interests, this Article proposes a 
two-step approach. As an initial matter, states should have to artic-
ulate a claimed purpose with enough specificity that courts can 
measure whether a law succeeds in meeting its stated purpose. Ab-
stract, obscure goals, such as enhancing respect for fetal dignity, 
should give way to concrete, tangible benefits. Next, in evaluating 
whether a law advances its stated goal, a court should consider: (1) 
whether a law addresses a measurable problem; (2) whether the law 
improves on the results achieved by previous policies; and (3) 
whether the law has some quantifiable (if not numerically specific) 
benefit. Analyzing abortion regulations under this framework will 
provide more consistency, clarity, and coherence for legislatures and 
lower courts. The approach suggested here will help to ensure that 
the Court maintains the balance that Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 5  and Whole Woman’s Health 6 
crafted. 
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part I surveys some of the 
major antiabortion legislation premised on the recognition of new 
governmental interests in regulating abortion. Part II begins to place 
these laws in historical context, tracing the origins of antiabortion 
efforts to move beyond a governmental interest in protecting life 
                                                                                                         
 3  See, e.g., id.; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
(plurality opinion); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod. Health (Akron I), 
462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
 4  See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10. 
 5  Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.  
 6  Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2309–10. 
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from the moment of conception. This Part focuses on the campaigns 
for the recognition of two interests: (1) the protection of women and 
(2) the protection of the family. As this Part shows, this effort shaped 
the Court’s decisions from City of Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
ductive Health (Akron I)7 to Casey. Part III examines pro-life efforts 
to frame governmental interests in fetal life that go beyond the pre-
vention of fetal killing, showing how this campaign influenced the 
Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart.8 Part IV begins by analyz-
ing what Whole Woman’s Health does and does not clarify about 
how courts should evaluate the claimed purpose of antiabortion leg-
islation. Drawing on the history collected and analyzed in this Arti-
cle, Part V proposes a clearer approach for courts dealing with new 
governmental interests supporting abortion regulations.  
I. BEYOND LIFE: NEW GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS 
In the fall of 2017, the House of Representatives passed a ban 
on abortions after the twentieth week of pregnancy.9 This proposal 
appeared doomed in the Senate.10 However, seventeen states cur-
rently have such a ban in place.11 Proponents of a twenty-week ban, 
including the National Right to Life Committee (“NRLC”) and 
Americans United for Life (“AUL”), contend that such laws prevent 
fetal pain. NRLC’s fact sheet on the Pain-Capable Unborn Child 
Act, model legislation on the subject, stresses that there is “[e]xten-
sive evidence that unborn children have the capacity to experience 
                                                                                                         
 7  462 U.S. 416 (1983).  
 8  550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 9  Jessie Hellmann, House Passes 20-Week Abortion Ban, HILL (Oct. 3, 
2017), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/353709-house-passes-20-week-abort 
ion-ban; see also Anna North, The House Just Passed a Twenty Week Abortion 
Ban. Opponents Say It’s “Basically Relying on Junk Science,” VOX (Jan. 29, 
2018), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/10/3/16401826/abortion-ban-pain-
capable-unborn-child-protection-act. 
 10  See, e.g., Ed Kilgore, House Passes Twenty-Week Abortion Ban on Near-
Perfect Party Line Vote, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 3, 2017), http://nymag.com/daily/ in-
telligencer/2017/10/house-passes-20-week-abortion-ban-on-party-vote.html. 
 11  See, e.g., State Policies on Later Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST., 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/state-policies-later-abortions 
(last updated Oct. 1, 2018). 
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pain, at least by 20 weeks fetal age.”12 AUL has also championed a 
model law, the Women’s Health Defense Act, that bans abortion at 
the same point.13 The organization justifies the ban because “there 
is substantial and well-documented medical evidence that an unborn 
child by at least 20 weeks gestation has the capacity to feel pain 
during an abortion” and because there are “documented risks to 
women’s health.”14  
Twenty-week bans have captured the imagination of abortion 
opponents partly because some polls indicate that a majority of vot-
ers would support such a law.15 However, twenty-week bans also 
form part of a larger twist on antiabortion strategy: an effort to erode 
abortion rights by convincing the courts to recognize new compel-
ling interests justifying government intervention. 
This approach represents a different take on antiabortion incre-
mentalism, a strategy that first fell in place in the decade after Roe 
v. Wade.16 This Part begins by briefly discussing the rise of pro-life 
incrementalism. Next, this Part examines the new focus on identify-
ing governmental interests in regulating abortion, exploring some of 
the most significant new antiabortion proposals. 
A.  The Rise of Incrementalism 
Opposition to legal abortion reaches back to the 1930s and 
1940s, when the Catholic Church connected hostility to abortion to 
                                                                                                         
 12  Key Points on Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, NAT’L RIGHT 
TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC. (Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.nrlc.org/uploads/ fe-
talpain/KeyPointsOnPCUPA.pdf. 
 13  AM. UNITED FOR LIFE, DEFENDING LIFE 2012: BUILDING A CULTURE OF 
LIFE, EXPOSING AND CONFRONTING THE ABORTION INDUSTRY 235 (2012), 
http://www.aul.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/model-womens-health-defense-
act.pdf [hereinafter DEFENDING LIFE 2012] (publishing the Women’s Health De-
fense Acts as “AUL Model Legislation”). 
 14  Id. 
 15  See, e.g., Matt Hadro, Marist Poll: 6 in 10 Americans Support a 20-Week 
Abortion Ban, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/2017/jan/24/marist-poll-6-in-10-americans-favor-20-week-aborti/; Eugene 
Scott, Most GOP Lawmakers Support Banning Late-Term Abortions, and So Do 
a Lot of Women, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/the-fix/wp/2017/10/04/most-gop-lawmakers-support-banning-late-term-
abortions-and-so-do-a-lot-of-women/?utm_term=.00bd572721a8. 
 16  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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contraception.17 But over the next several decades, as efforts to re-
form or repeal abortion laws took hold, an organized pro-life move-
ment took shape.18 These pro-life groups took no official position 
on birth control.19 Although NRLC received support from the Cath-
olic Church, pro-life groups emphasized secular arguments, often 
pointing to right-to-life language in the Declaration of Independ-
ence.20 The movement also had a constitutional agenda.21 Pro-life 
attorneys argued that protection for the unborn child could be found 
in the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.22  
Roe v. Wade rejected what abortion foes viewed as many of their 
strongest arguments. First, the Court addressed the question of fetal 
personhood.23 Roe treated this mostly as a textual matter, focusing 
on how the word “person” was used throughout the Constitution.24 
Since the text seemed to apply the term only postnatally, the Court 
concluded that the fetus could not be a person within the meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.25 Next, the Court considered whether 
the government had a compelling interest in protecting life from the 
moment of conception.26 Here, the Court focused on the divergence 
of religious, medical, and ideological opinions as to when life be-
gins.27 If experts could not agree on when life begins, as the Court 
reasoned, the state could not impose one conclusive view of the sub-
ject on everyone else.28 
                                                                                                         
 17  See, e.g., DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, DEFENDERS OF THE UNBORN 3–12 (2016). 
 18  On the emergence of the pro-life movement, see, for example, id.; MARY 
ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE 38–51 
(2015) [hereinafter ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE]. 
 19  See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 17, at 58–62, 91–95. 
 20  See, e.g., id. at 90–119; ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 18, at 39–40. 
 21  On the pro-life movement’s constitutional agenda in the period, see Mary 
Ziegler, Originalism Talk: A Legal History, 2014 BYU L. REV. 869, 870–71, 
884 (2014). 
 22  See, e.g., id. at 884. 
 23  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–157 (1973). 
 24  See id. at 157–58. 
 25  See id. at 158. 
 26  See id. at 159. 
 27  See id. at 160–62. 
 28  See id. at 162. 
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Roe did not immediately discourage pro-lifers from prioritizing 
a constitutional right to life.29 Indeed, within months of the Supreme 
Court’s decision, several members of Congress put forth constitu-
tional proposals that would undo Roe.30 Two such examples of con-
stitutional proposals are the amendment proposed by Representative 
Lawrence Hogan (R-MD) that would protect a right to life “from the 
moment of conception,”31 and the alternative amendment proposed 
by Senator James Buckley (Conservative-NY), which stated: “With 
respect to the right to life, the word ‘person’ . . . applies to all human 
beings, including their unborn offspring at every stage of their bio-
logical development.” 32 However, from the very beginning of abor-
tion opposition, there has been a dispute among pro-life attorneys 
who wanted to chip away at Roe incrementally by emphasizing laws 
that would only limit access to abortion, and pro-life lawmakers who 
fought for an absolute ban of abortion by passing a constitutional 
amendmentt.33  
Pro-life lawyers experimented with different litigation tech-
niques. Rather than asking the Court to recognize a fundamental 
right to life, pro-life lawyers argued that courts could uphold some 
abortion regulations without overruling Roe. 34  In Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,35 for example, AUL 
argued that Roe permitted informed-consent restrictions.36 Danforth 
seemingly vindicated AUL’s new approach.37 Although the Court 
struck down several parts of the challenged Missouri law, the Court 
upheld an informed-consent regulation and explained that “[t]he de-
cision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and 
                                                                                                         
 29  See, e.g., ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 18, at 38–45. 
 30  See NAT’L COMMITTEE FOR A HUMAN LIFE AMEND., HUMAN LIFE AMEND-
MENT: MAJOR TEXTS (2004), https://www.humanlifeaction.org/sites/default/files/ 
HLAmajortexts.pdf. 
 31  Id. at 3.  
 32  Id. at 1. 
 33  See, e.g., ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 18, at 77–78.  
 34  See Motion and Brief, Amicus Curiae of Dr. Eugene Diamond and Amer-
icans United for Life, Inc. at 43–52, in Support of Appellees in 74-1151 and Ap-
pellants in 74-1419 at 43–52, Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52 (1976) (Nos. 74-1151, 74-1419) [hereinafter AUL Brief]. 
 35  428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
 36  AUL Brief, supra note 34, at 86–88. 
 37  See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 65–67. 
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it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of 
its nature and consequences.”38 
Following Danforth, the pro-life movement had reason to ex-
pand its incremental approach beyond the courts. The same year that 
the Court issued a decision in Danforth, Congress passed the Hyde 
Amendment, a rider to an appropriations bill that outlawed Medicaid 
reimbursement for abortion.39 When it passed, the Hyde Amend-
ment struck many in the pro-life movement as an unprecedented 
success. As early as 1974, Ray White, the new executive director of 
NRLC, insisted that cutting federal funding for abortion would stop 
270,000 abortions a year.40 The amendment seemed even more stra-
tegically significant after the Supreme Court issued a series of deci-
sions on abortion funding, including Maher v. Roe41 and Harris v. 
McRae.42 
Maher upheld a Connecticut statute outlawing most Medicaid 
funding for abortions by applying the constitutional “undue burden” 
standard.43 “[W]e have held that a requirement for a lawful abortion 
‘is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an 
abortion,’” the Maher court stated.44 But a law could not be unduly 
burdensome if it “place[d] no obstacles—absolute or otherwise—in 
the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion.”45 Because the govern-
ment did not create poverty, Maher concluded that there was no 
                                                                                                         
 38  Id. at 67. 
 39  On the passage of the Hyde Amendment and its significance, see NICOLE 
MELLOW, THE STATE OF DISUNION 138–145 (2008); LAURENCE TRIBE, ABOR-
TION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 153 (1992). 
 40  On White’s estimate, see Ray White, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Right to Life 
Comm., to Bd. of Dir., Nat’l Right to Life Comm. (Nov. 1974) (The American 
Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, Box 8, 1974 NRLC Folder 1). For more on 
the movement’s interest in funding, see Nat’l Right to Life Comm., Senate Votes 
to Prohibit Federal Funding for Abortion (Oct. 1974) (The American Citizens 
Concerned for Life Papers, Box 8, 1974 NRLC Folder 1). On the relative abortion 
rates of Medicaid-eligible and Medicaid-ineligible women, see Jacqueline Dar-
roch Forest, Christopher Tietze & Ellen Sullivan, Abortion in the United States, 
1976–1977, 10 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 270, 274–75 (1978). 
 41  432 U.S. 453 (1977). 
 42  448 U.S. 297, 300–01 (1980). 
 43  Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74. 
 44  Id. at 473 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976)). 
 45  Id. at 474. 
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constitutional violation.46 McRae upheld the federal Hyde Amend-
ment for similar reasons.47 
Maher and McRae strengthened the pro-life interest in an alter-
native to the constitutional approach, one that would allow abortion 
foes to slowly chip away at legal abortion and reduce abortion 
rates.48 Incrementalism, as its proponents called it, gained support 
because the constitutional strategy had stalled.49 Between 1974 and 
1977, no fetal-personhood amendment received a vote.50 
Following the election of President Ronald Reagan, who 
strongly opposed abortion, abortion foes controlled Congress and 
the White House and it seemed possible that a constitutional amend-
ment would pass.51 Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) introduced the so-
called Human Life Bill in January 1981.52 The federal statute that 
Helms proposed would have gutted abortion rights by defining the 
fetus as a person from the moment of conception.53 At the same 
time, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT) proposed a constitutional amend-
ment that would allow the states and Congress to ban abortion.54 
Thus, by the summer of 1981, Congress had two clear paths to un-
dermining Roe.55 
Internal divisions soon doomed both the Hatch Amendment and 
the Human Life Bill. Absolutists denounced the Hatch Amendment 
as a betrayal of the movement’s principles, a proposal that would 
not recognize a right to life and would allow Congress to claim to 
be pro-life without outlawing a single abortion.56 Pragmatists, in 
contrast, thought that the Human Life Bill and other more ambitious 
                                                                                                         
 46  Id. at 469. 
 47  McRae, 448 U.S. at 315. 
 48  On pro-life incrementalism, see ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 18, at 
58–61. 
 49  See id. at 59 
 50  Id. at 51. 
 51  See id. at 83. 
 52  See, e.g., Joan Beck, Pro-Life Groups Turn to Congress on Abortion, CHI. 
TRIB., Jan. 23, 1981, at B2; see also ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 18, at 84. 
 53  See, e.g., Beck, supra note 52. 
 54  On the Hatch Amendment, see ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 18 at 86–
88; Anti-Abortion Group Backs Hatch Proposal, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 
1981), https://www.nytimes.com/1981/12/13/us/anti-abortion-group-backs-
hatch-proposal.html. 
 55  See ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE, supra note 18, at 86–88. 
 56  Id.  
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proposals would not pass or would be struck down in the courts.57 
Following the failure of Hatch’s and Helms’ proposals, Hatch and 
his allies made a last-ditch attempt to pass an amendment.58 Hatch 
joined Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) in proposing a modified 
version of Hatch’s original Amendment, which was named the 
“Hatch-Eagleton Amendment” and was slated for a full Senate vote 
in June 1983.59 Behind the scenes, almost everyone had given up, 
and with reason: the Senate defeated the Hatch-Eagleton Amend-
ment by a vote of 49 to 50.60 
The failure of the Hatch-Eagleton Amendment, together with the 
success of the Hyde Amendment, strengthened the hand of pro-life 
incrementalists. Incrementalism prioritized limits on access to abor-
tion.61 By winning concrete victories, the pro-life movement hoped 
to energize its members, convince donors to back the movement, 
and persuade politicians that pro-life voters could swing some elec-
tions.62 Incrementalism, its proponents hoped, would set the stage 
for overruling Roe.63 Convincing the Court to uphold some abortion 
regulations would shake the foundation of abortion rights, making 
abortion doctrine seem incoherent and ultimately convincing the 
Justices that there was nothing left of Roe to uphold.64 Finally, in-
crementalism could lower the abortion rate before a more complete 
constitutional solution could be put in place.65 
As this Article shows, a new wave of antiabortion legislation re-
flects a different take on pro-life incrementalism, which was cen-
tered on the recognition of new justifications for regulating abortion. 
This Part canvasses some of the most important examples of new 
antiabortion legislation, exploring why and how abortion foes have 
proposed new legislative rationales for abortion restrictions or ex-
panded on existing ones. 
In 2016, in Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court devas-
tated abortion opponents who expected a decision equating the 
                                                                                                         
 57  See, e.g., id. 
 58  See id. at 88–89. 
 59  See id. 
 60  See id. at 89. 
 61  See id. at 88–89. 
 62  See id. at 90. 
 63  See id. at 88. 
 64  See id. 
 65  See id. at 85. 
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undue burden standard with rational basis review. 66  However, 
Whole Woman’s Health did little to change the kind of legislation 
pro-lifers aggressively backed. This Part focuses on new legislative 
interests shaping major legal campaigns pursued by the antiabortion 
movement. 
B.  Fetal Pain, Fetal Dignity, and Other Interests 
NRLC first pointed to fetal pain as a reason for legislative inter-
vention during debate about the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban 
Act,67 a law outlawing dilation and extraction abortions (“D&X”), a 
procedure whereby a provider removes a fetus intact.68 NRLC relied 
on the testimony of Dr. Kanwaljeet Anand, suggesting that “[m]ul-
tiple lines of scientific evidence converge to support the conclusion 
that the fetus can experience pain from 20 weeks of gestation.”69 
Anand’s testimony initially served NRLC’s claim that partial-birth 
abortion—which was often performed later in pregnancy—should 
be banned as a way of preventing fetal pain.70  In 2011, NRLC 
started promoting the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Act, a twenty-
week abortion ban, as an independent piece of legislation.71 Ne-
braska and Kansas became the first and second states, respectively, 
to pass such a law, and others quickly followed.72 
                                                                                                         
 66  See Mary Ziegler, Liberty and the Politics of Balance: The Undue burden 
Test After Casey/Hellerstedt, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 421, 454 (2017) [here-
inafter Ziegler, Liberty and the Politics of Balance]. 
 67  S. Res. 3, 108th Cong., 117 Stat. 1201 (2003).  
 68  See, e.g., Expert Report of Kanwaljeet S. Anand, M.B.B.S., D.Phil., Car-
hart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Carhart v. 
Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (No. 
4:03CV3385), http://www.nrlc.org/uploads/fetalpain/AnandPainReport.pdf 
[hereinafter Expert Report]; Letter from Douglas Johnson, Legislative Dir., Nat’l. 
Right to Life Comm., to Sci. and Med. Editors/Reporters (Jan. 2, 1996), 
http://www.nrlc.org/uploads/fetalpain/Anesthesia%20Myth%20Memo.pdf [here-
inafter Letter from Douglas Johnson].  
 69  Expert Report, supra note 68, at 5. 
 70  See id. 
 71  On the original push for such legislation, see Press Release, Nat’l. Right to 
Life Comm., Carhart Move Demonstrates Need for Protective Legislation (Nov. 
18, 2010), http://www.nrlc.org/communications/releases/2010/release111810 
[hereinafter Carhart].  
 72  H.B. 2218, 2011 Sess. (Kan. 2011) (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-
6724 (2012). On the Kansas law, see Press Release, Nat’l. Right to Life Comm., 
Brownback Signs Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act (Apr. 12, 2011), 
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NRLC and AUL have also promoted a model law outlawing di-
lation and evacuation abortions (“D&E”), a procedure whereby a 
provider removes a fetus in several parts.73 Starting in 2015, NRLC 
began pushing laws that banned most D&Es.74 Eight states passed a 
version of this model law, although courts have enjoined enforce-
ment of most of them.75 Pro-life groups advocate for these laws by 
pointing to governmental interests beyond the protection of fetal 
life.76 NRLC claims that bans on D&E prevent fetal pain,77 but also 
defends these laws by pointing to a “separate and independent com-
pelling interest in fostering respect for life” or “protecting the integ-
rity of the medical profession with passage of this law.”78 
AUL and NRLC invoked similar legislative interests in defend-
ing a new wave of laws governing the disposal of fetal remains. In 
2016 alone, nine states passed laws like Texas’ SB8, which requires 
health-care facilities to bury or cremate fetal or embryonic re-
mains.79 An earlier generation of similar laws has been in place for 
decades, but the new laws more clearly rely on a governmental 
                                                                                                         
http://www.nrlc.org/communications/releases/2011/release041211 [hereinafter 
Brownback]. For other states that passed such a law see, for example, ALA. CODE 
§ 26-23B (2017); IDAHO CODE § 18-505 (2018); OKLA. STAT. 63 § 1-745.5 
(2017). 
 73  OBOS Abortion Contributors, Dilation and Evacuation Abortion, OUR-
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interest in fetal dignity.80 In 2015, AUL began promoting a model 
law of this kind, the Unborn Infants’ Dignity Act (“UIDA”).81 The 
UIDA would require women to be given a choice to bury or cremate 
fetuses that have reached a certain stage of development provided 
that a miscarriage or abortion takes place at a health-care institu-
tion.82 Women who do not choose to make these arrangements must 
consent to whatever disposition a healthcare provider elects.83  
The rationale for the UIDA goes beyond the conventional inter-
est in protecting fetal life. Like fetal-pain laws, the UIDA does noth-
ing (at least in theory) to prevent abortion.84 Instead, as Anna Pap-
rocki of AUL has explained, those passing the law claim an interest 
not in restricting abortion but in ensuring that “human beings [are] 
treated with dignity and respect at death.”85  
AUL and NRLC have also refined arguments involving laws de-
signed to protect women. As Part II shows, the protection of women 
represented one of the first alternative governmental purposes cham-
pioned by pro-lifers. At first, abortion foes focused primarily on the 
psychological harm that women could face.86 More recently, tar-
geted regulation of abortion providers (“TRAP laws”), like the law 
struck down by the Court in Whole Woman’s Health, have zeroed in 
on purported threats to women’s physical health.87 The new woman-
protective laws have a different focus, claiming to protect women 
from domestic violence or medical abortion, a method using pills 
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rather than surgical techniques to end pregnancy.88 For example, 
AUL model legislation would make it a serious crime to coerce an-
yone to have an abortion and would require abortion clinics to post 
signs stating that no one can be forced into an abortion.89 The law 
further identifies parties who must report any suspected coerced 
abortion, mandates that physicians privately counsel women about 
coerced abortion, and delay performing an abortion when coercion 
is reasonably suspected.90 AUL also introduced laws requiring man-
datory counseling for any woman seeking medical abortion91 and 
strict regulations on the issuance and use of “abortion-inducing 
drugs.”92  The group claims that “medical evidence demonstrates 
that the current FDA-approved protocol carries significant risks and 
administering the drugs outside the current FDA protocol places 
women at even greater risk.”93  
Why have abortion foes invested so much in laws advancing in-
terests beyond protecting fetal life? To be sure, as the Article shows 
in Part II, the answer is partly political. Starting in the late 1980s, 
when a clinic-blockade movement exploded onto the political scene, 
pro-life leaders argued that the public too often viewed abortion op-
ponents as anti-woman extremists.94 By focusing on laws that claim 
to help women, pro-lifers hope to challenge this negative image.95 
One might also argue that abortion foes have little choice but to fo-
cus on governmental interests beyond the protection of fetal life. 
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After all, the Roe Court rejected the argument that the government 
had a compelling interest in protecting life from the moment of con-
ception.96 Pro-lifers might have every reason to repackage interests 
tied to fetal life as an interest in fetal dignity or fetal suffering. 
But a close look at the new legislation that pro-lifers have backed 
shows that identifying new legislative interests has broader strategic 
importance. First, abortion foes hope to dislodge viability as the 
point at which states can fully ban abortion.97 Under both Roe and 
Casey, the government cannot outlaw abortion outright until a fetus 
reaches viability: the point at which an unborn child can survive out-
side the womb.98 By playing to public discomfort with late term 
abortions, NRLC and AUL hope to inch closer to the point at which 
lawmakers can outlaw abortion.99 As important, the identification of 
new governmental interests would allow the Court to radically un-
dercut the protections created by Roe and Casey without explicitly 
overruling either one.100 As Mary Spaulding Balch of NRLC ex-
plains: “Recognizing a compelling state interest in the unborn child 
who is capable of experiencing pain would not require the Court to 
overturn, but only to supplement, its prior recognition of a compel-
ling state interest in the unborn child after viability.”101 The capacity 
to feel pain, as Spaulding Balch reasons, can serve as a back-door 
strategy for establishing fetal personhood.102 She argues,  
It is critically important to understand that the inter-
est asserted here is not just one in diminishing or 
eliminating unborn children’s pain. Rather, it is that 
the fact of the unborn child’s having the capacity to 
experience pain is a significant developmental mile-
post making the unborn child at that point 
                                                                                                         
 96  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162–63 (1973).      
 97  See, e.g., Memorandum from Mary Spaulding Balch, Dir., State Legisla-
tion Dep’t, on Constitutionality of the Unborn Child Protection from Dismember-
ment Abortion Act 2 (July 2013), https://www.nrlc.org/uploads/ state-
leg/PCUCPAConstitutionality.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from Mary Spauld-
ing Balch]; TALKING POINTS, supra note 76, at 4.   
 98  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64; Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 883, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 99  See Memorandum from Mary Spaulding Balch, supra note 97, at 1. 
 100  Id.  
 101  Id. at 2. 
 102  See id. at 3. 
2018] THE NEW ANTIABORTION INCREMENTALISM 93 
sufficiently akin to an infant or older child to trigger 
a compelling state interest.103  
Moreover, if the evidence supporting fetal pain at twenty weeks 
is uncertain, Spaulding Balch argues that lawmakers are still free to 
act.104 “States may make judgments based on substantial medical 
evidence even when there is medical dispute,” Spaulding Balch em-
phasizes.105 NRLC has offered a similar justification for promoting 
a new compelling interest in the context of dismemberment laws.106 
According to an NRLC factsheet,  
The states enacting the Unborn Child Protection 
from Dismemberment Abortion Act are not asking 
the Supreme Court to overturn or replace the 1973 
Roe v. Wade holding that the state’s interest in un-
born human life becomes “compelling” at viability. 
Rather, the states are applying the interest the Court 
recognized in the 2007 Gonzales case, that states 
have a separate and independent compelling interest 
in fostering respect for life by protecting the unborn 
child from death by dismemberment abortion.107 
By convincing the Court to recognize abstract, broad compelling 
governmental interests, antiabortion attorneys can justify far more 
sweeping regulations without asking the Court to recognize fetal 
personhood or repudiate Roe or Casey. Pro-life attorneys can also 
advocate for laws that do not seem to advance the state’s interest in 
protecting life articulated in Casey, while creating an obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking abortion. If the Court is willing to recog-
nize interests in fetal dignity, preventing abortion coercion, or elim-
inating fetal suffering, pro-life attorneys can defend a far wider array 
of restrictions. These governmental interests could open the door for 
states to extensively restrict abortion earlier in pregnancy. 
Where does the new purpose-centered incrementalism come 
from, and how, if at all, has it shaped the Supreme Court’s abortion 
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jurisprudence? Part II begins to develop an answer to these questions 
by tracing the roots of some of the incoherence plaguing the Court’s 
abortion doctrine: a shifting willingness to recognize and redefine 
interests beyond the protection of fetal life. 
II. OTHER PURPOSES: FROM DANFORTH TO CASEY 
Convinced that the Supreme Court would not recognize a right 
to life in the near future, pro-life incrementalists began searching for 
alternative justifications for regulating abortion. Part II begins by 
exploring the first effort of this kind in the leadup to Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, where abortion foes 
urged the Court to recognize an interest in protecting the husband-
wife or parent-child relationship.108 Danforth picked up on a differ-
ent rationale for regulating abortion, one that is centered on the con-
sequences of decisional autonomy for women.109  
Part II next shows that after the Court upheld a mandated-coun-
seling law, abortion foes began stressing the importance of the gov-
ernment’s interest in protecting women’s health. Although the Su-
preme Court rejected this argument in 1983,110 the majority, which 
previously supported strong abortion rights, shrank as Presidents 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush nominated new members to the 
Court. Meanwhile, abortion opponents continued championing al-
ternative governmental interests.111  Together, Danforth, Akron I, 
and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecol-
ogists112 sent a somewhat confusing message about the identifica-
tion of new governmental interests. The Court suggested, but never 
formally held, that the government could not only regulate unsafe 
                                                                                                         
 108  428 U.S. 52, 67 (1976). 
 109  Id. 
 110  City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health (Akron I), 462 U.S. 416, 
448 (1983). 
 111  See Linda Greenhouse, Senate, 97 to 0, Confirms Kennedy to High Court, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1988, at A18; Paul Houston, Lawmakers’ Reaction to Bush 
Choice Favorable but Cautious Senate: Few Know Much About Souter’s Record. 
However, Many See Rudman’s Enthusiastic Endorsement as a Plus, L.A. TIMES 
(July 24, 1990), at A14 [hereinafter Lawmakers’ Reaction to Bush]; Al Kamen, 
Kennedy Confirmed, 97-0; Senate Approves Supreme Court Nomination, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 4, 1988, at A0. 
 112  476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
2018] THE NEW ANTIABORTION INCREMENTALISM 95 
procedures but could also protect women from unwise decisions.113 
At the same time, the Court sent conflicting signals about whether 
and to what degree the government had to show that an informed-
consent law improved women’s decision-making.114 
The incoherence of the Court’s jurisprudence only grew follow-
ing the decision of Thornburgh.115 After Thornburgh, the pro-life 
movement once again started emphasizing a compelling interest in 
protecting fetal life, believing that the Court would soon overrule 
Roe.116 The Court’s decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Ser-
vices only reinforced interest in this strategy.117  However, some 
abortion opponents began stressing the political costs of so exclu-
sively stressing an interest in fetal life. Members of AUL specifi-
cally insisted that this tactic portrayed the pro-life movement as anti-
woman.118 These activists urged their colleagues to stress an interest 
in protecting women.119 This Part shows that Casey reflected this re-
emerging effort to carve out a governmental interest in protecting 
women. The Casey decision reinvigorated efforts to identify multi-
ple governmental interests that support abortion restrictions. If the 
Court was reluctant to overrule Roe directly, as pro-lifers concluded, 
it might be possible to erode abortion rights by convincing the Court 
to recognize more and more reasons that the government could reg-
ulate abortion.120 
Casey also further muddied the Court’s treatment of the govern-
ment’s interest in fetal life. Was the government limited to an inter-
est in preventing fetal killing? Or did Casey also recognize related, 
but less tangible, interests like respect for fetal life? Casey had cer-
tainly held that the government’s interest in protecting fetal life ap-
plied throughout pregnancy, but had the Court also suggested that 
an interest in protecting life was weightier than Roe suggested?121 
Without answering these questions (or overruling earlier precedents 
                                                                                                         
 113  See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 65–67. 
 114  See Akron I, 462 U.S. at 448–49. 
 115  476 U.S. 747 (1986). 
 116  Ziegler, Originalism Talk, supra note 21, at 916–17. 
 117  492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 118  See Jensen, supra note 94, at 5. 
 119  Id. 
 120  See Ziegler, Liberty and the Politics of Balance, supra note 66, at 447–48. 
 121  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) 
(plurality opinion). 
96 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:78 
that treated them differently), Casey added another layer of incon-
sistency to the Court’s abortion jurisprudence.122 
A.  After Roe: Reasons for Restricting Abortion 
The Court’s decision in Roe dashed the hopes of those who had 
believed that the justices would recognize a compelling governmen-
tal interest in protecting fetal life.123  Pro-life groups initially re-
sponded by avoiding the courts, instead championing a constitu-
tional amendment that would ban abortion and force the Court to 
uphold laws criminalizing the procedure.124 At the same time, how-
ever, antiabortion attorneys recognized that championing an interest 
in protecting fetal life might not be enough to advance the move-
ment’s cause in Congress or the courts.125  
Pro-lifers speculated that alternative justifications for banning 
abortion might appeal to a broader audience.126 In the 1970s, to ex-
plore this possibility, pro-lifers argued that Congress and the states 
had a compelling interest in banning abortion to protect the nuclear 
family from the forces that threatened it.127 Dennis Horan, a pro 
bono attorney for the AUL, maintained that Roe “provided one more 
wedge to separate, undermine and ultimately destroy the nuclear 
family.”128 Horan argued that Roe awarded unfair power to pregnant 
women, threatening their relationships with their husbands and un-
dermining fathers’ unions with their children. 129  Joseph With-
erspoon, a University of Texas professor, made a similar argument. 
Witherspoon insisted that Roe ran counter to both the Thirteenth and 
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Fourteenth Amendments.130 As Witherspoon saw it, the Thirteenth 
and Fourteenth Amendments not only recognized an unborn child’s 
right to life but also men’s fundamental rights to have a paternal 
relationship with their unborn children.131 The government, With-
erspoon suggested, had a compelling interest in protecting men’s 
rights as husbands and fathers.132 
When the abortion issue returned to the Supreme Court, antia-
bortion attorneys hoped that the Court might pave the way for new 
regulations by recognizing a new governmental interest.133  AUL 
took on this strategy in its amicus brief in Danforth, a case involving 
a multi-part Missouri restriction.134  AUL repeated familiar argu-
ments that the Constitution recognized a fundamental right to life 
and attacked Roe as constitutionally unsound.135  
However, the group also contended that the Missouri statute was 
constitutional even under Roe because that decision had identified a 
number of interests that could justify abortion regulations.136 AUL 
reasoned that,  
Although in the Roe decision this Court explicitly 
mentioned only three state interests, i.e., maternal 
health, medical standards, and prenatal life, which 
could justify regulating the right of privacy in the 
context of the abortion decision, there are persuasive 
reasons to believe that those interests mentioned 
were never envisaged as exclusive.137  
In addition to the government’s interest in protecting fetal life, 
AUL stressed that the government had a compelling interest in pro-
tecting women’s health.138 AUL also advocated for a compelling 
state interest in protecting the family.139 “The narrow issue, then,” 
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AUL asserted, “is whether allowing a wife to make a unilateral de-
cision of the magnitude of the abortion decision could be destructive 
of the family entity.”140  
AUL also hoped that the Court would radically broaden already-
recognized governmental interests. For example, the organization 
stressed the importance of protecting women’s health when defend-
ing an informed-consent regulation.141 AUL argued that Roe had 
“enumerated some of the factors, medical and psychological, con-
cerning which the woman and her physician would necessarily con-
sider in consultation prior to making the abortion decision.”142 If 
Roe had recognized that the abortion decision was “a stressful one 
at best,” then the Court should recognize a compelling interest in 
women’s mental health and let stand the mandatory-consent provi-
sion.143  
Although Danforth struck down most of Missouri’s law, the 
Court’s decision did suggest that pro-lifers could make incremental 
progress by championing new governmental interests in restricting 
abortion and by expanding existing ones.144 The Court reasoned that 
if the government could not veto a woman’s abortion decision, Mis-
souri could not delegate that power to a woman’s spouse.145 More-
over, the Court suggested that if a man and woman could not agree, 
the woman was more directly impacted by pregnancy and should 
have the ultimate say about abortion.146 Nevertheless, as pro-lifers 
noted, the Court spoke favorably of the “deep and proper concern 
and interest that a devoted and protective husband has in his wife’s 
pregnancy and in the growth and development of the fetus she is 
carrying.”147 Perhaps the problem with Missouri’s law was that it 
was not narrowly tailored—allowing a man a complete veto—rather 
than requiring notification.  
Danforth upheld the mandatory-consent provision, reinforcing 
pro-lifers’ interest in redefining the government’s interest in 
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protecting women’s health.148 Those challenging the Missouri law 
had argued that it singled out abortion, requiring written consent for 
no other surgical procedures, and likely had a chilling effect on 
women, sending the message that abortion was wrong.149 The Court 
disagreed, citing the government’s interest in protecting women’s 
health.150 As Justice Harry Blackmun explained,  
The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and 
often a stressful one, and it is desirable and impera-
tive that it be made with full knowledge of its nature 
and consequences. The woman is the one primarily 
concerned, and her awareness of the decision and its 
significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the 
State to the extent of requiring her prior written con-
sent.151  
While Danforth did not recognize new governmental justifications 
for restricting abortion, the Court did suggest that the interest in pro-
tecting women’s health might be broader than many had imag-
ined.152 Whereas the Roe Court focused on the threat of physical 
complications following an abortion, Danforth suggested that the 
government might have a compelling interest in safeguarding 
women’s mental health, and abortion opponents hoped to capitalize 
on this.153 
B.  Redefining Women’s Health 
In the aftermath of Danforth, abortion foes invested more in the 
identification or expansion of governmental interests in restricting 
abortion. The pro-life movement did so partly by promoting a model 
antiabortion law, first adopted in Akron, Ohio as Ordinance No. 
160-1978, that showcased the effort to identify new justifications for 
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regulating abortion. 154  The City of Akron ordinance built on 
Danforth. For example, the law included a narrower parental-in-
volvement requirement and a broader informed-consent provision 
that demanded that women hear controversial information, includ-
ing disputed statements about the risks of abortion.155  
When the Supreme Court decided to hear a constitutional chal-
lenge to the City of Akron ordinance, pro-life attorneys went beyond 
the strategy laid out in Danforth, arguing that any laws that did not 
have the purpose of limiting access to abortion should not be subject 
to strict judicial scrutiny.156 If a law had a different purpose, such as 
helping women, then a law was constitutional in “the first three 
months of pregnancy so long as such regulation does not ‘unduly 
burden’ a woman’s constitutionally-protected right to have an abor-
tion.”157  
Akron I picked up on language in some of the Court’s earlier 
abortion opinions, including Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I) and Ma-
her.158 Bellotti I, a case about minors and abortion, reinforced the 
Court’s finding in Danforth that an abortion regulation “is not un-
constitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abor-
tion.”159 However, in Bellotti I and Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), the 
Court acknowledged that cases involving minors’ rights were dif-
ferent—parents had constitutional rights that could come into play, 
and the government could more readily justify actions taken to pro-
tect minors from the consequences of unwise decisions.160 Neither 
Bellotti I nor Bellotti II spelled out whether a similar analysis would 
apply to adults’ abortion rights.161 Maher, an abortion funding case, 
expanded on the idea of an unconstitutional undue burden.162 Maher 
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held that the abortion right protected women only from “unduly bur-
densome interference with her freedom to decide whether to termi-
nate her pregnancy.”163 By extension, as the Court explained, the 
right “implies no limitation on the authority of a State to make a 
value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement 
that judgment by the allocation of public funds.”164 
Relying upon these precedents, the City of Akron argued that 
some kind of undue burden analysis should apply to every abortion 
case, not just those involving abortion funding or minors.165 If the 
Court applied the undue burden analysis, then the justices would 
“balance the woman’s interest against the nature of the state’s inter-
ference in exercising that right.”166 The City of Akron illustrated 
how this constitutional approach would work. When defending its 
informed-consent provision, the City stressed that the ordinance was 
not designed to obstruct abortion access but was “designed to protect 
the woman and ensure that her consent will be truly informed.”167 
The City argued that as a result, the Court should balance women’s 
interest in abortion against the government’s proper interest in pro-
tecting women.168  
In an amicus brief on behalf of Feminists for Life, AUL put a 
similar emphasis on new governmental interests in restricting abor-
tion.169 As AUL reasoned, the City of Akron’s informed-consent 
regulation was not designed to limit access to abortion.170 Instead, 
AUL emphasized that the law was “intended to insure the integrity 
of the woman’s decision-making process prior to abortion.”171 If 
abortion hurt women, as AUL reasoned, then the state had a duty 
and compelling interest in regulating abortion.172 “In addition to en-
abling the woman to make a meaningful choice, information on fetal 
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development may protect her from the trauma which she may later 
experience because of an improvident and uninformed decision in 
this regard,” AUL stressed.173  
Although a majority rejected the arguments made by the City of 
Akron and AUL, dissenters in Akron I suggested that the movement 
could make progress by identifying new governmental justifications 
for regulating abortion. While reiterating that the government had 
an interest in protecting women’s mental health, the Court reined in 
states’ power to pass informed-consent regulations.174 The Court re-
peated that “certain regulations that have no significant impact on 
the woman’s exercise of her right may be permissible where justi-
fied by important state health objectives.” 175  Nevertheless, the 
Court suggested that states could not force women to consume inac-
curate information designed to dissuade them from choosing abor-
tion.176 When it came to the City of Akron ordinance, the Court 
stressed that “much of the information required is designed not to 
inform the woman’s consent but rather to persuade her to withhold 
it altogether.”177 
In some ways, Akron I seemed hard to reconcile with Danforth. 
In theory, Akron I recognized the same governmental interest iden-
tified by Danforth. However, the Court in Akron I expressed consid-
erable skepticism about whether the government had a real interest 
in protecting women’s mental health.178 Akron I framed the differ-
ence between the ordinance discussed in the case and the Missouri 
statute discussed in Danforth as one involving the type of infor-
mation detailed in the law.179 As Akron I described it, the City of 
Akron required physicians to speculate or opine on when life be-
gan.180 Likewise, the ordinance at issue in Akron I set out a parade 
of horribles that was somewhat less than accurate.181  
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However, the differences between the laws—and the govern-
mental interests supporting them—were less pronounced than the 
Court suggested. Arguably, the law in Danforth was designed to dis-
courage some women from terminating their pregnancies.182 More-
over, as in Akron I, Danforth arguably involved “intrusion upon the 
discretion of the pregnant woman’s physician.”183 The Court sent 
conflicting messages about whether the government could legiti-
mately act to protect women’s mental health without patronizing 
and insulting them. 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, President Reagan’s first Supreme 
Court nominee, wrote a dissent that sent yet another signal about the 
recognition of new governmental interests in regulating abortion.184 
O’Connor stressed that the Court had already expanded the govern-
ment’s interest in protecting women’s health, but she went a step 
further: she also asserted that whatever governmental interests jus-
tified abortion regulations applied throughout pregnancy, not just in 
later trimesters.185 
Justice O’Connor also adopted a version of the undue burden 
standard proposed by the City of Akron and AUL.186 The City of 
Akron and AUL had focused partly on the purpose of a law, sug-
gesting that the government should have more latitude to regulate 
abortion when the law was not intended to obstruct abortion ac-
cess.187 O’Connor, by contrast, emphasized the probable effect of an 
abortion restriction.188 “The abortion cases demonstrate that an ‘un-
due burden’ has been found for the most part in situations involving 
absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision,” 
O’Connor wrote.189 She reasoned that the Court had mostly struck 
down laws that completely eliminated abortion access or criminal-
ized the procedure altogether.190 
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C.  The Aftermath of Akron I 
Although Justice O’Connor dissented from the majority, her 
opinion did provide a new touchstone for pro-life incrementalists 
seeking to forge a post-Roe strategy.191 However, because O’Con-
nor did not focus on the purpose (beneficial or otherwise) of abor-
tion regulations, groups like AUL temporarily emphasized different 
strategies.192 One involved the shifting date of viability.193 O’Con-
nor had stressed that as medical technology evolved, viability would 
move earlier and earlier in pregnancy.194 In 1984, at a conference on 
how to build on O’Connor’s dissent, AUL and its allies agreed that 
the “most advantageous starting point” for a new strategy was “a 
critical examination of Roe’s reliance on the concept of viability.”195  
AUL asserted that by shaping the Court’s understanding of via-
bility, abortion opponents could argue “the state’s interest in pre-
serving that life must begin at a much earlier stage of develop-
ment.”196 AUL conferees did discuss the government’s interest in 
protecting women’s health.197 But rather than explaining ways to 
convince the Court to define health more broadly, conferees zeroed 
in on ways to narrow the supposed health-based justifications for 
abortion, including the benefits to women’s health.198 
The Supreme Court’s next abortion case, Thornburgh, did noth-
ing to change antiabortion attorneys’ shift away from purpose argu-
ments.199 Thornburgh involved a model Pennsylvania law that in-
cluded familiar provisions, such as an informed-consent measure, 
and viability-based restrictions. 200  Although Thornburgh struck 
down the disputed law, the majority in favor of abortion rights 
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shrank to five.201 Chief Justice Warren Burger, one of the justices 
who had joined the original majority in Roe, pointed to Akron I and 
Thornburgh as evidence that abortion jurisprudence had become 
hopelessly muddled.202 Chief Justice Burger also suggested that the 
time might have come to reexamine Roe.203 Justice Byron White 
penned a dissent insisting that the Court should “recognize that Roe 
v. Wade departs from a proper understanding of the Constitution and 
overrule it.”204  
Thornburgh made it seem possible that one new justice could 
become the deciding vote to overrule Roe. It would not take long for 
the Court’s membership to change. In the summer of 1987, Justice 
Lewis F. Powell announced his retirement from the Court, and Pres-
ident Reagan nominated Judge Robert Bork of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to replace 
him.205 Bork’s nomination failed, becoming one of the most contro-
versial confirmation fights in history and setting the stage for the 
politicization of later nominees .206 Nevertheless, President Reagan 
quickly found a replacement, choosing Judge Anthony Kennedy of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.207 Justice 
Kennedy’s nomination sailed through Congress, and abortion foes 
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celebrated.208 “[T]he general assumption is that Kennedy will pro-
vide the swing vote determining whether the Court may begin to 
‘chip away’ at the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision,” argued National 
Right to Life News, NRLC’s flagship newsletter.209  
In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,210 a reconstituted 
Court seemed ready to fulfill the prediction made by National Right 
to Life News.211 The Webster Court agreed to hear a challenge to 
three parts of a Missouri abortion law: (1) a preamble stating that 
life begins at conception; (2) a prohibition on the use of public fund-
ing, counseling, or facilities for abortion; and (3) a statutory defini-
tion of viability.212 Pro-life groups focused not on promoting differ-
ent governmental interests but on convincing the Court to apply a 
forgiving standard of review to abortion regulations.213 In an amicus 
brief, for example, NRLC argued that the proper standard of review 
was rational basis—a standard that virtually any abortion regulation 
would survive.214 NRLC insisted that if the Court did not adopt a 
suitably relaxed standard of scrutiny, abortion doctrine would con-
tinue to be contradictory and confusing.215  
Webster energized those who hoped that the Court would soon 
overrule Roe outright. The Court upheld all of the challenged provi-
sions, but the most telling part of the opinion came in the plurality’s 
discussion of a viability-related measure.216 The Missouri law re-
quired that after the twentieth week of pregnancy, physicians should 
perform certain tests to ensure that a fetus was not viable.217 As 
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those challenging the law recognized, the provision was in tension 
with Roe, creating a presumption of viability in the second, rather 
than third, trimester.218 But as the plurality saw it, any problem re-
vealed by the Missouri law exposed flaws in the Roe decision, not 
the Missouri law.219 Webster suggested that there was no constitu-
tional foundation for Roe’s trimester framework.220 Moreover, the 
plurality reasoned that there was no reason that the government’s 
interest in protecting life should come into existence only in the third 
trimester.221 While Webster did not overrule Roe, Justice Antonin 
Scalia demanded explicit reconsideration of the decision, and the 
stage seemed set for a more direct confrontation.222 
Following Webster, abortion opponents picked up on another 
strategy outlined by AUL during the 1984 conference.223 As confer-
ees argued, Roe rested on the conclusion that women’s interest in 
health outweighed the government’s interest in protecting fetal 
life.224 Pro-life attorneys believed that if the Court’s composition 
changed, “the ‘health claim’ based solely on the psychological dis-
comfort . . . [became] markedly vulnerable.”225 As the Court became 
more convinced by pro-life claims about fetal personhood, the con-
ferees hoped to argue that the government’s interest in fetal life out-
weighed the concerns of women who chose abortion for the wrong 
reasons.226  
Following Webster, NRLC built on this strategy by putting out 
a model law that would outlaw abortion except in cases of rape, 
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incest, fetal abnormality, or threats to a woman’s life or health.227 In 
promoting these laws, NRLC lawyers compared conventional gov-
ernmental interests—those related to fetal life—to a woman’s rea-
sons for selecting abortion.228 Women who terminated pregnancy as 
a means “of birth control” or for purposes of convenience, as NRLC 
argued, would lose when the government invoked an interest in fetal 
life.229 In 1990, Idaho’s legislature became the first to pass such a 
law before Governor Cecil Andrus vetoed it.230 Louisiana consid-
ered a similar law in July.231 Although Louisiana Republican Gov-
ernor Buddy Roemer vetoed the Louisiana bill, it seemed even more 
likely that the Court would overrule after Justice William Brennan, 
a consistent vote for abortion rights, announced his retirement the 
same month.232 President George H.W. Bush chose David Souter, a 
New Hampshire Supreme Court judge, to replace Brennan. 233 
Likely hoping that Souter and Kennedy would vote to overturn Roe, 
NRLC attorneys continued pressing bans like the failed effort in 
Idaho.234 In January 1991, the effort paid off when Utah passed the 
strictest antiabortion law in the nation, outlawing abortion except in 
cases of rape, incest, “grave” fetal defect, or certain limited threats 
to a woman’s health. 235  The following July, Justice Thurgood 
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Marshall, another supporter of abortion rights, retired, and as his re-
placement, President George H.W. Bush nominated Judge Clarence 
Thomas of the DC Circuit Court of Appeals. 236  Since Justice 
Thomas was expected to vote to overrule Roe, it seemed to be only 
a matter of time before the Court held that Roe was no longer good 
law. 
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge to a multi-
restriction Pennsylvania law in Casey, most abortion opponents fo-
cused on the flaws in the Roe decision, the reasons for undoing the 
1973 decision, and the weak reasons that some women terminated 
their pregnancies. 237  However, some pro-lifers focused on the 
strength of the governmental interests in regulating or banning abor-
tion.238 In a brief submitted on behalf of the American Association 
of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“AAPLOG”), for ex-
ample, veteran pro-life attorneys William Bentley Ball and Maura 
Quinlan stressed that Roe erred by too narrowly describing the gov-
ernment’s interest in women’s health and fetal life and by limiting 
its application to later in pregnancy.239 Emphasizing that the gov-
ernment had an interest in protecting life, not potential life, Ball and 
Quinlan urged the Court to recognize a compelling interest in pro-
tecting fetal life throughout pregnancy.240 Similarly, citing incidents 
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of sub-standard abortion care, the AAPLOG brief maintained that 
there was a compelling interest in protecting women’s health 
throughout pregnancy.241  
In a brief submitted on behalf of Feminists for Life and several 
crisis pregnancy centers, Pat Buchanan’s American Center for Law 
and Justice returned to a tactic developed in Akron I.242 The brief 
insisted that Roe had too narrowly described the government’s in-
terest in protecting women’s health.243 “A woman’s right to deter-
mine her own medical treatment, guaranteed by both common and 
constitutional law, is illusory when the only information provider is 
an entity with a financial interest in a particular outcome of her de-
cisional process, and who supports only one option,” the brief ar-
gued.244 The brief reasoned that if the Court properly understood the 
government’s compelling interests, then the justices would uphold 
the Pennsylvania law.245 
Casey dealt in complicated ways with social-movement debate 
about when the government had a compelling interest in regulating 
abortion. The Court began by reaffirming Roe’s essential holding—
that the Constitution protects a right to abortion.246 Interestingly, the 
Court also retained viability as the point at which states could ban 
most therapeutic abortions.247 While acknowledging that the time of 
viability could change because of technological developments, the 
Court concluded that these factual shifts in no way undermined the 
soundness of viability as a constitutional marker.248 As the Court 
explained, viability was the most workable endpoint that the courts 
could identify.249 Additionally, because viability came late in preg-
nancy, the plurality reasoned that it was fair to ask women who 
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waited until after viability to subordinate their interests to those of 
the state.250  
But, for the Casey plurality, the trimester framework was flawed 
both because it neglected, or defined too narrowly, the government’s 
interests and because it allowed the government to advance these 
interests only later in pregnancy.251 Casey concluded that there was 
no reason that the government could not ensure throughout preg-
nancy that a woman’s “choice is thoughtful and informed.”252  The 
Court further stated that “[i]t follows that States are free to enact 
laws to provide a reasonable framework for a woman to make a de-
cision that has such profound and lasting meaning.”253 The govern-
ment had an interest in protecting women’s mental and physical 
health, as Casey reasoned.254 Moreover, the government could act 
to advance its interest in “protecting the life of the unborn” by “ex-
pressing a preference for normal childbirth.”255  
According to Casey, the government could justifiably act to pro-
tect life as long as the law was not designed specifically to under-
mine women’s rights.256 As the Court explained, “[t]he fact that a 
law which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the 
right itself, has the incidental effect of making it more difficult or 
more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invali-
date it.” 257  Regulations were only problematic if they deprived 
women of the right to make the ultimate decision.258 Importantly, 
the government’s interest in protecting women’s mental health and 
the life of the unborn mattered throughout pregnancy.259  
As an alternative to the trimester framework, the Court adopted 
a version of the undue burden standard.260 “A finding of an undue 
burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has 
the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of 
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a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus,” Casey ex-
plained.261 What would it mean for a law to have an impermissible 
purpose? First, Casey explained that the government could not pri-
marily intend to obstruct a woman from receiving an abortion be-
cause “the means chosen by the State to further the interest in po-
tential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, 
not hinder it.”262 The Court further suggested that the government 
had interests beyond protecting fetal life or women’s health.263 Ca-
sey reiterated that if a law severely limited abortion, it might be un-
constitutional even if the law was “furthering the interest in potential 
life or some other valid state interest.”264  
What counted as examples of valid state interests? The Court 
certainly went beyond the interest in protecting fetal life.265 The 
government could regulate abortion in such a way not only to pre-
vent fetal killing but also to “express profound respect for the life of 
the unborn.”266 Casey did not illuminate the boundaries of this state 
interest.267 Did all abortion regulations express respect for the life of 
the unborn? Was this interest stronger later in pregnancy rather than 
earlier? How could courts tell the difference between a law designed 
to obstruct women and a law expressing respect for the life of the 
unborn? Casey raised these questions but answered none of them.268  
Nevertheless, Casey did clarify that the government could act to 
protect women’s health or to persuade women to choose childbirth 
over abortion.269 However, there was still some ambiguity in how 
Casey described these interests. Could the government protect 
women’s emotional or psychological health, or was this interest nar-
rower? Did laws designed to encourage a woman to carry a preg-
nancy to term have to expressly state such a goal—as an informed-
consent regulation might?  
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Casey did shed some light on these questions in its treatment of 
the disputed Pennsylvania regulations.270 Consider Casey’s analysis 
of the informed-consent restriction. Those challenging the law had 
questioned whether it benefitted women’s health.271 After all, the 
law required women to receive information about fetal development 
that had no direct bearing on women’s health.272 Casey first sug-
gested that the government could impose such a regulation even if 
doing so did not advance an interest in women’s health.273 As Casey 
explained, an informed-consent regulation could advance the gov-
ernment’s interest in expressing respect for life.274 However, Casey 
also held that the mandatory-consent regulation protected women’s 
health.275 “It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is 
a facet of health,” Casey reasoned.276 “In attempting to ensure that a 
woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State 
furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman 
may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psy-
chological consequences, that her decision was not fully in-
formed.”277 The Court further upheld parental-involvement and rec-
ord-keeping provisions.278  
When the Court struck down a spousal-notification provision, 
Casey focused on the women who would be most affected—those 
who faced potential domestic violence if they had to notify their 
husbands before terminating a pregnancy.279 The Court hinted at 
how purpose analysis would work in its approach to the spousal-
notification law. 280  While the government had highlighted hus-
bands’ interest in the life of the children their wives were carry-
ing,281 the Court nevertheless implied that laws designed to force 
women to consult with their spouses might have no rational basis.282 
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As Casey reasoned, the law treated marriage as a relationship be-
tween equals who could make decisions of their own.283 “A State 
may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his wife that par-
ents exercise over their children,” Casey stated.284 The Court did not 
suggest that Pennsylvania had sought nothing more than to obstruct 
women seeking abortion. The government’s interest in men’s rights 
was problematic in its own right.285 Casey thus suggested both that 
the government could identify new justifications for regulating abor-
tion and that some of those proposed interests could be constitution-
ally out of bounds.286  
In the aftermath of Casey, it was not clear whether the Court’s 
analysis of a statute’s purpose would help the supporters or the op-
ponents of abortion rights. Could abortion-rights supporters readily 
prove that a claimed government interest was pretextual? Would 
abortion opponents be able to use Casey to identify a wide variety 
of new interests and expand the government’s power to restrict abor-
tion? Part III examines the Court’s answers to these questions. 
III. FROM CASEY TO GONZALES: RECOGNITION OF NEW  
PURPOSES 
In the aftermath of Casey, those on both sides did not know what 
the courts would make of Casey’s purpose prong.287 Would the pur-
pose prong allow abortion-rights supporters to more effectively at-
tack new regulations? How easily could abortion foes convince the 
Court to recognize new justifications for limiting abortion? This Part 
begins by exploring the first major decision to discuss Casey’s pur-
pose prong, Mazurek v. Armstrong.288 Next, this Part looks at pro-
lifers’ response to Casey and Mazurek, especially the expansion of 
the government’s interest in protecting women. Finally, this Part ex-
amines how the fight against what pro-lifers called partial-birth 
abortion encouraged the antiabortion movement to focus more on 
the recognition of abstract new governmental purposes. This 
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initiative contributed to the Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Car-
hart,289 a decision that energized those who saw the recognition of 
new governmental interests as a strategy for undermining abortion 
rights. 
A.  Interpreting Casey 
Immediately after Casey, those on both sides contested the 
meaning of the undue burden standard.290 In Mazurek, the Court 
seemed poised to clarify the meaning of the test. That case involved 
a 1995 Montana regulation prohibiting physician assistants from 
performing abortions, requiring all second-trimester abortions to be 
performed in a hospital, and banning advertisements for abortion.291 
A group of plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the law and 
sought a preliminary injunction.292 The district court had enjoined 
the provisions requiring abortions to be in hospitals and banning so-
licitation of abortion services, but concluded that the physician-only 
requirement did not create an undue burden.293 The Ninth Circuit 
reversed, enjoining the physician-only requirement and holding that 
respondents had shown a fair chance of success on the merits of their 
claim, and thus had met the threshold requirement for preliminary 
injunctive relief.294 
When the Supreme Court took the case, the justices addressed 
whether the plaintiffs had a fair chance of success in showing that 
the physician-only requirement created an undue burden. Lawyers 
working with the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy (now the 
Center for Reproductive Rights) stressed that Montana was a rural 
state with few physicians.295 The Center argued that as a result, 
eliminating access to physician assistants would force women in the 
state seeking abortions to drive to a single abortion clinic in Bo-
zeman, Montana, to be treated by a female provider.296 Much of the 
Center’s argument centered on Casey’s purpose prong.297 Montana 
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claimed that the law was designed to protect women’s health.298 The 
Center contended that this was pretext.299  
What proof was there of pretext? First, the Center emphasized 
that there was no problem that the law had solved—all the available 
evidence suggested that physician assistants safely performed abor-
tions.300 Second, Montana had singled out abortion for additional 
regulation allowing physician assistants to perform what were un-
questionably riskier procedures.301 Moreover, evidence suggested 
that the lawmakers backing the bill acted on behalf of Montana 
Right to Life, a group that openly aimed to end all abortions.302 
Mazurek rejected these arguments, seemingly undercutting Ca-
sey’s purpose prong.303 According to the Court’s interpretation, the 
Ninth Circuit held that the law was problematic solely because of its 
purpose, not its effect. 304  Mazurek called into question whether 
courts could ever justifiably strike down a law only on the basis of 
having an impermissible purpose.305 But even if Casey authorized 
such a result, the Court held that Montana’s law would pass muster 
under Casey’s purpose prong.306 The Court first suggested that law-
makers had significant latitude in requiring professionals to do a job 
even if objective evidence suggested that this requirement had no 
benefit.307 Nor did the fact that a pro-life group had drafted the law 
sway the Court.308  
Mazurek suggested that the purpose prong of Casey might help 
pro-lifers more than supporters of abortion rights.309 Indeed, Ma-
zurek introduced more confusion into the Court’s analysis of the 
purpose of antiabortion legislation. First, Casey had sent contradic-
tory signals about how many legitimate interests the government 
could identify in restricting abortion and how readily abortion-rights 
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supporters could smoke out an insidious goal.310 Then, Mazurek 
suggested that it would be practically impossible to challenge the 
purpose of a law.311 
Antiabortion groups responded by seeking to define more 
broadly the interests that the Court had already recognized. In par-
ticular, for both political and constitutional reasons, groups like 
AUL sought to convince the Court to adopt a broad understanding 
of the government’s interest in protecting women’s health.312 As 
early as 1987, pro-life activist David Reardon wrote C. Everett 
Koop, then the Surgeon General, arguing that a focus on women’s 
health might “launch [the] nation into a new era of debate about 
abortion, one based not on fetus vs. woman rhetoric, but rather on 
the facts about what abortion does to women alone.”313 As Reva 
Siegel has shown, abortion opponents in the late 1980s and early 
1990s faced a perfect storm: the election of pro-choice President Bill 
Clinton, the radicalization of the clinic-blockade movement, and the 
murder of abortion providers and clinic staff. 314  These circum-
stances convinced abortion opponents to change their argumentative 
strategy.315 At an AUL conference for state legislators, Laurie Ann 
Ramsey summarized the results of market research on the image of 
the antiabortion movement: “[W]e are also viewed as extremists, 
hypercritical, violent, intolerant and unconcerned about women, 
poverty and homelessness.”316 “The [movement’s] focus on concern 
for the unborn child neglects mention of the mother of that child,” 
Mary Ellen Jensen, a public-relations specialist at AUL explained at 
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the time.317 “Communicating greater concern for the women . . . 
must be a key objective of any pro-life communication strategy.”318 
After Casey, AUL prioritized what pro-lifers called “right to 
know” laws, informed-consent mandates that would sway women to 
carry pregnancies to term and would position the debate in broader 
terms.319 In defending these laws, AUL and NRLC would expand 
on the government’s interest in protecting women’s mental health—
a governmental purpose hinted at in Casey itself.320 
B.  Partial-Birth Abortion and New Purposes 
In the leadup to the Supreme Court’s next case, Gonzales v. Car-
hart, pro-lifers experimented with a more ambitious agenda, con-
vincing the Court to recognize new governmental interests instead 
of just expanding existing ones. The years leading up to Gonzales 
turned on discussion of what pro-lifers called partial-birth abortion, 
a procedure whereby a provider removed a fetus intact from a 
woman’s uterus.321 The procedure first came to NRLC’s attention 
after Dr. Martin Haskell gave a paper on the procedure at the annual 
conference of the National Abortion Federation (“NAF”).322 Minne-
sota abortion opponents got a copy of the paper and created a sketch 
of the abortion procedure that Haskell described, using this material 
in an advertisement opposing the Freedom of Choice Act, a pro-
posed federal bill that would have codified abortion rights.323 By 
1995, when Republicans took control of the House of Representa-
tives for the first time in decades, NRLC emphasized a federal bill 
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banning the procedure.324 First drafted in 1995, the federal Partial 
Birth Abortion Ban Act (“PBABA”) outlawed “an abortion in which 
the person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a liv-
ing fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery.”325 
How did abortion opponents describe the purpose of the law? 
After all, outlawing one abortion procedure did not seem to protect 
fetal life. 326  The proposal left available any other abortion 
method.327 So why had Congress singled out one procedure? Strate-
gically, the emphasis on partial birth abortion had a clear payoff. 
Douglas Johnson of NRLC labeled the law “an educational exer-
cise.”328  “Many Americans wrongly believe that abortion is not 
available after 13 weeks of pregnancy,” Johnson said.329 “We want 
people to be aware that abortions are being performed on unborn 
human beings, 20 weeks and beyond, when they look like babies 
and have a capacity to feel pain.”330  
In fighting for the PBABA, pro-lifers and their allies in Congress 
built on Johnson’s suggestion about fetal pain, suggesting that the 
government had an interest in preventing fetal suffering or 
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gratuitous insults to fetal dignity.331 Pro-lifers pushed similar laws 
in the states and, in 2000, the Supreme Court agreed to hear a chal-
lenge to one of them in Stenberg v. Carhart.332 
That case addressed the constitutionality of a Nebraska law out-
lawing “an abortion procedure in which the person performing the 
abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before 
killing the unborn child and completing the delivery.”333 Noting the 
wording of the statute, those challenging the Nebraska law argued 
that it would ban not only D&X but also D&E, the most widely used 
second-trimester abortion procedure.334 Those challenging the law 
further contended that it created an undue burden even if it covered 
only D&X because the law lacked a health exception.335 By depriv-
ing women of what would be the safest abortion procedure under 
certain circumstances, as the challengers reasoned, the law unduly 
burdened women’s rights.336 Nebraska responded that the law cov-
ered only D&X and that there was inadequate evidence that D&X 
was safer for women than available alternatives.337  
The majority sided with those challenging the law, concluding 
that Nebraska had banned D&X and unduly burdened women.338 
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s dissent sent a different signal to the an-
tiabortion movement.339  Because of the message sent by Justice 
Kennedy’s dissent, the Court’s decision in Stenberg sharpened 
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abortion foes’ interest in promoting more legislative justifications 
for abortion regulations. 
Justice Kennedy highlighted the legitimacy of what he saw as 
the interests underlying Nebraska’s ban.340 To be sure, as Kennedy 
reasoned, the law might advance an interest in protecting fetal 
life.341 But Kennedy went further, stating: “States also have an in-
terest in forbidding medical procedures which, in the State’s reason-
able determination, might cause the medical profession or society as 
a whole to become insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including life 
in the human fetus.”342 Kennedy suggested that there was something 
about D&X that would undermine the image that many held of phy-
sicians as healers.343  
What was it about the procedure that would arguably have this 
effect? “D & X’s stronger resemblance to infanticide means Ne-
braska could conclude the procedure presents a greater risk of dis-
respect for life and a consequent greater risk to the profession and 
society, which depend for their sustenance upon reciprocal recogni-
tion of dignity and respect,” Kennedy reasoned.344 
Because of the appearance of D&X, the procedure undermined 
respect for fetal life—an interest that went beyond an interest in pre-
venting fetal killing.345 Equally important, as Kennedy saw it, pro-
hibiting this one method of abortion would send a message about 
the dignity of human life.346 As Kennedy stated,  
Nebraska instructs all participants in the abortion 
process, including the mother, of its moral judgment 
that all life, including the life of the unborn, is to be 
respected . . . The differentiation between the proce-
dures is itself a moral statement, serving to promote 
respect for human life; and if the woman and her phy-
sician in contemplating the moral consequences of 
the prohibited procedure conclude that grave moral 
consequences pertain to the permitted abortion 
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process as well, the choice to elect or not to elect 
abortion is more informed; and the policy of promot-
ing respect for life is advanced.347 
Congress had twice passed a federal partial-birth-abortion ban, 
but President Clinton had vetoed it.348 Starting in 2002, notwith-
standing the Court’s decision in Stenberg, pro-lifers again called for 
a federal ban. 349  Kennedy’s Stenberg dissent later provided a 
roadmap for those demanding such a ban: Congress would have to 
make extensive findings on both the purpose of the law and the need 
for a health exception.350  The version of the PBABA ultimately 
passed in 2003 first defined the prohibited procedure more narrowly, 
arguably excluding D&E procedures.351 Congress also made find-
ings supporting both the need for the law and justification for elim-
inating a health exception.352  
When it came to the purpose of the law, Congress deliberately 
went beyond justifications related to the prevention of fetal kill-
ing.353 One interest involved attitudes toward fetal life: banning a 
procedure that many found gruesome would improve the odds that 
people would view fetal life with respect or reverence. 354  As 
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Congress explained: “Implicitly approving such a brutal and inhu-
mane procedure by choosing not to prohibit it will further coarsen 
society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and 
innocent human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such 
life.”355 President George W. Bush signed the federal ban into law 
in 2003,356 and when the Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge 
to the law, pro-lifers again sought to carve out new justifications for 
regulating abortion. A brief submitted on behalf of a group of 
women who claimed to have suffered post-abortion trauma argued 
that the federal PBABA was intended to protect women’s mental 
health.357 Congress, as the brief argued, acted to ban partial birth 
abortion in the belief that the procedure “poses serious risks to the 
long-term health of women and in some circumstances, their 
lives.”358 Other briefs foregrounded an interest in preserving the in-
tegrity of the medical profession.359  
C.  Interpreting Gonzales 
Gonzales vindicated those who believed that the recognition of 
new governmental interests would erode abortion rights. 360  The 
Court began by rejecting arguments that the challenged law was un-
constitutionally vague or outlawed both D&E and D&X.361 The ma-
jority turned then to the application of the undue burden standard.362 
Justice Kennedy’s majority canvassed the purposes underlying the 
act.363  
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First, Gonzales recognized a justification in expressing “respect 
for the dignity of human life.”364 What did this entail? In part, as the 
Court reasoned, Congress could act to reinforce a distinction be-
tween infanticide and abortion.365 Kennedy also suggested that Con-
gress could seek to protect women from post-abortion regret.366 
“Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of 
love the mother has for her child . . . Whether to have an abortion 
requires a difficult and painful moral decision[,]” Kennedy ex-
plained.367 “While we find no reliable data to measure the phenom-
enon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to 
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sus-
tained.”368 Gonzales further held that the law was constitutional not-
withstanding the law’s lack of a health exception.369 The Court rea-
soned that if a matter was scientifically uncertain, Congress had the 
power to intervene.370 
Notably, Gonzales stood in tension with earlier decisions ad-
dressing the government’s interest in fetal life or women’s health. 
When it came to fetal life, the Court previously focused on the pro-
tection of fetal life as opposed to fetal dignity or the quality of fetal 
life.371 Was the idea of respect for life articulated in Gonzales a new 
state interest? Had the Court redefined fetal personhood—a concept 
rejected by Roe? The Court provided little guidance on these mat-
ters.372 What about the government’s interest in protecting women’s 
mental health? The Court had cast doubt on the validity of this in-
terest in Akron I and Thornburgh. 373  Although Casey partly 
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overruled these decisions,374 Gonzales suggested that the govern-
ment’s interest in protecting women was far broader than Casey im-
plied: an interest that came into play even when abortion-related 
counseling was not at issue.375 How broad was this interest? Would 
any abortion restriction protect women by lowering the chances of 
abortion regret?  
Gonzales also encouraged AUL and NRLC to identify new com-
pelling interests underlying abortion regulation. By doing so, abor-
tion opponents hoped to replace viability with an earlier time when 
abortion could be banned.376 However, some pro-lifers had a more 
ambitious plan.377 Gonzales gave legislators so much room to regu-
late that some abortion opponents believed that the undue burden 
standard had become rational basis review by another name. 378 
When the Supreme Court agreed to hear a challenge to Texas’s H.B. 
2, antiabortion lawyers tried to formalize that the undue burden test 
provided little protection for abortion rights.379  Whole Woman’s 
Health represented a setback for pro-life lawyers, reinvigorating the 
purpose prong of Casey.380 However, as Part IV shows, the Court’s 
most recent decision left uncertain what it would mean for a statute 
to have a legitimate purpose under Casey. 
IV. A MEANINGFUL PURPOSE ANALYSIS: WHOLE WOMAN’S 
HEALTH 
In 2016, the Supreme Court agreed to hear its first abortion case 
in more than a decade.381 Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt 
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involved two parts of Texas’ H.B. 2.382 One required abortion doc-
tors to have admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles.383 
A second mandated that abortion clinics comply with state regula-
tions governing ambulatory surgical centers (“ASC”).384 This Part 
begins by exploring the strategic stakes of the case for both opposing 
social movements. Pro-lifers set aside a focus on the purpose of a 
law, arguing instead that the undue burden standard was so deferen-
tial that no analysis of a statute’s purpose was required. As this Part 
shows next, the Court rejected this argument, weaving analysis of a 
statute’s purpose into a balancing analysis. But as this Part con-
cludes, Whole Woman’s Health left open crucial questions about 
how courts should approach new justifications for abortion regula-
tions. 
A.  The Stakes of Whole Woman’s Health 
AUL predicted that Whole Woman’s Health would be “the most 
significant abortion case before the Supreme Court in decades.”385 
Why did the case command so much attention? In Texas, the impact 
of H.B. 2 seemed likely to be profound. Most providers did not have 
and likely could not get admitting privileges because, among other 
reasons, not enough women went to the hospital after an abortion to 
meet threshold admitting requirements. 386  For many clinics, the 
ASC requirements would be prohibitively expensive, especially 
those demanding the overhaul of clinic facilities.387 Data suggested 
that it would cost clinics $1 million to comply with the ASC regula-
tions; it would be three times more to build a new facility.388 If the 
Court upheld Texas’ law, other states with antiabortion laws already 
on the books would be able to pass laws similar to H.B. 2. 
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Pro-life lawyers hoped to establish that the undue burden stand-
ard required courts to uphold almost all abortion regulations.389 Ever 
since Casey came down, opposing activists had contested the mean-
ing of the standard.390 Following Gonzales, abortion foes hoped that 
the Court would clarify that the standard was deferential and tooth-
less.391 When the Court agreed to hear a challenge to H.B. 2, it 
seemed that the time had come to establish what the undue burden 
standard really required.392 
Abortion providers first challenged only the admitting-privi-
leges law.393 While the district court held that the requirement cre-
ated an undue burden, the Fifth Circuit reversed.394 Not long after 
the Fifth Circuit’s decision, abortion providers returned to court, this 
time challenging the ASC regulation and arguing that the admitting-
privileges mandate was unconstitutional as applied to clinics in 
McAllen and El Paso.395 Although the district court again sided with 
Whole Woman’s Health, 396  the Fifth Circuit reversed a second 
time.397 In part, the court relied on the doctrine of res judicata, em-
phasizing that providers could have raised the same challenges dur-
ing their original lawsuit.398 The court further offered its perspective 
on what the undue burden standard required.399 “Following Car-
hart and Casey,” the court explained, “our circuit conducts a two-
step approach, first applying a rational basis test, then independently 
determining if the burden on a woman’s choice is undue.”400  
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When the Supreme Court took the case, those on both sides dis-
puted what the undue burden standard required.401  Representing 
Whole Woman’s Health, the Center for Reproductive Rights in-
sisted that “[t]he undue burden standard strikes a careful balance be-
tween a woman’s liberty to make decisions about childbear-
ing . . . with the State’s profound interest in potential life.”402 What 
did this balancing require? The Center argued that the courts had to 
weigh “the severity of the obstacle relative to the strength of the 
state's interest in imposing it.”403 To determine the purpose of the 
law, the Center argued, the Court should not blindly accept the leg-
islators’ account of what they were doing.404  Instead, the Court 
sould evaluate whether a law reasonably advanced its stated end.405  
What about the effect of the law? The Center argued that the 
decrease in abortion access would have an impermissible effect, “in-
creasing the wait time for appointments at abortion facilities and the 
distances that many women would have to travel to reach those fa-
cilities.”406 Insisting that these effects had to be weighed against the 
health benefits (or lack thereof) created by the Texas law, the Center 
argued that H.B. 2 unduly burdened women’s rights.407 
Texas read the undue burden standard quite differently.408 Texas 
argued that, rather than evaluating the strength of the government’s 
purpose, the Court should recognize that “[c]onstitutional analysis 
of a statute’s purpose is highly deferential.”409 The fact that lawmak-
ers knew or should know that H.B. 2 would close clinics did not 
change the analysis.410 “In any industry, businesses that do not meet 
governing regulations may not be able to operate, and a legislature 
may be well aware of that fact[,]” Texas reasoned.411 “But that does 
not prove a legislative purpose to produce whatever effects may 
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flow from closing a business, rather than to achieve the public-wel-
fare benefits of the regulations.”412 When it came to the law’s ef-
fects, Texas argued that most women would still live near metropol-
itan areas with an abortion clinic.413 
B.  Purpose Under Whole Woman’s Health 
In June 2016, a short-handed Court handed down a five-to-three 
decision adopting a balancing analysis similar to the one proposed 
by the Center.414  Holding that res judicata did not bar the petition-
ers’ challenge, the Court addressed the meaning of the undue burden 
standard.415 The Court first established that under Casey, “courts 
consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with 
the benefits those laws confer.”416 The Court pointed to two provi-
sions analyzed by Casey as an example of how the test should apply: 
the parental-involvement law upheld in that case and the spousal-
notification measure struck down by the Court.417 In both of these 
cases, as Whole Woman’s Health explained, the Court performed a 
“balancing.”418  
The Court further clarified what kind of evidence courts would 
use in performing this balancing.419 Texas had argued that under 
Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court’s earlier decision upholding the fed-
eral Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act, courts should defer to lawmak-
ers’ assessments of contested scientific evidence.420 Because law-
makers believed that H.B. 2 was needed to protect women’s health, 
as Texas asserted, the Court should defer to the legislatures’ reason-
ing.421 Whole Woman’s Health held instead that courts should inde-
pendently assess the purpose and effect of a law,422 placing the most 
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“weight upon evidence and argument presented in judicial proceed-
ings.”423  
It was obvious that Whole Woman’s Health treated the undue 
burden standard as something quite different from rational basis, and 
the Court viewed the purpose of a law as constitutionally meaningful 
and deserving of some scrutiny.424 But how exacting was purpose 
analysis, and what precisely did Whole Woman’s Health require as 
part of the purpose analysis? The Court’s analysis of H.B. 2 offered 
some clues. When it came to the admitting-privileges provision, 
Texas claimed that the requirement would “ensure that women have 
easy access to a hospital should complications arise during an abor-
tion procedure.”425 In evaluating the admitting-privileges require-
ment, the Court first emphasized the safety of abortion procedures: 
most procedures came early in pregnancy, and even in later tri-
mesters, the rate of complications was exceedingly low.426 Lawmak-
ers had a less compelling purpose because “there was no signifi-
cant health-related problem that the new law helped to cure.”427   
The Court next examined evidence about the benefit conferred 
by the admitting-privilege requirement as compared to the law pre-
viously in place.428 Stressing that the rare complications that did 
arise emerged after a woman left an abortion clinic, the Court rea-
soned that there was no evidence that the requirement helped any 
women.429 Against this lack of benefit, the Court weighed the bur-
den created by the law.430 The Court noted that the number of clinics 
in Texas fell by half after the government implemented the require-
ment.431 The Court found enough evidence that H.B. 2 caused the 
clinic closures: most clinics could not meet admitting-privilege re-
quirements because, among other reasons, abortion was safe enough 
that hospital admissions were rare.432 Clinic closures, in turn, meant 
longer travel distances, “fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and 
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increased crowding.”433 These burdens, weighed against the lack of 
a benefit created by the requirement, led the Court to hold the ad-
mitting-privilege requirement unconstitutional.434 
The Court applied a similar analysis to the ASC provision. Be-
cause many women received abortion via medication or procedures 
performed through the birth canal, the Court reasoned that many of 
the ASC requirements would not benefit women.435 Even in the case 
of surgical abortions, most of the ASC requirements were irrele-
vant.436 Emphasizing the safety of abortion, the Court concluded 
that the ASC provision conferred no benefit compared to the regu-
lations that Texas had previously put in place.437  
What can we glean about purpose analysis from Whole Woman’s 
Health? To be sure, the membership of the Court is in flux, and the 
Court’s vision of the undue burden standard could easily change 
again. Moreover, Whole Woman’s Health did not answer many of 
the crucial questions surrounding purpose analysis in the abortion 
context. Before the Court’s decision, those in opposing movements 
clashed about how many interests were legitimate in the abortion 
context.438 Should lawmakers limit themselves to the interests rec-
ognized in Casey and Gonzales? Or, were there a potentially limit-
less list of governmental interests that could justify abortion regula-
tions? Some key pro-life initiatives depended on the Court’s recog-
nition of more governmental interests.439 Whole Woman’s Health 
left uncertain the fate of this effort.440  
And how would courts determine if a law addressed a real prob-
lem? It seemed straightforward when lawmakers claimed that a law 
had a tangible, quantifiable benefit, like reducing post-abortion 
complications or more effectively addressing them. 441  But how 
would the Court resolve a law like the federal PBABA? What pro-
cedure would the Court use to evaluate if there was a problem with 
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public respect for human life? Or a lack of dignity assigned to fetal 
life? 
Whole Woman’s Health also shed little light on how important 
the purpose prong was in relation to the effect that a law would have 
on abortion access.442 If a law advanced a compelling interest, how-
ever a court defined it, would that justify significant burdens on the 
abortion decision? Is the purpose prong more important than the ef-
fect prong or vice versa? 
These are significant ambiguities. The future of many of the 
most important antiabortion proposals turns partly on how the Court 
answers open questions about the purpose analysis under Casey.443 
In promoting twenty-week bans and dismemberment prohibitions, 
abortion opponents hope that the Court will replace viability with an 
earlier biological marker: the point at which unborn children can 
theoretically experience pain.444 Whole Woman’s Health does not 
illuminate how or when the courts should acknowledge new govern-
mental interests, especially when the government’s justification re-
lates to fetal life rather than women’s health.445 Pro-lifers also cham-
pion scientifically contested or abstract justifications for laws in-
volving matters like D&E, the disposal of fetal remains, and the pro-
hibition of later abortions.446 When it comes to abstract governmen-
tal interests, like the preservation of fetal dignity, the Court’s most 
recent decision offers little guidance to lower courts.447 By contrast, 
when the purpose for a law depends on disputed evidence, Whole 
Woman’s Health offers only a few clues about how courts should 
resolve these battles or how to read Gonzales’ deference on this sub-
ject. 
How should the Court resolve these ambiguities? Part V devel-
ops a doctrinal approach that will clarify the application of Whole 
Woman’s Health, offering more guidance to legislators and protect-
ing the delicate balance struck by Casey and its progeny. 
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V. HOW TO MEASURE PURPOSE: A CLARIFICATION 
Whole Woman’s Health provides a useful starting point for 
courts seeking to develop a more coherent purpose analysis. This 
Part proposes a doctrinal clarification that courts should use in un-
derstanding the purpose prong of Casey and Whole Woman’s 
Health. Next, this Part explores how this analysis would apply to 
some of the antiabortion legislation now under consideration. 
Whole Woman’s Health, like Casey and Gonzales, held open the 
possibility that legislators could identify new justifications for reg-
ulating abortion. The question, however, is how courts should ap-
proach both new justifications for abortion regulations and familiar 
ones. Lawmakers introducing new abortion legislation should first 
have to articulate a legislative goal with adequate specificity. Instead 
of stating that a law protects fetal dignity, for example, legislators 
should have to define fetal dignity and explain how a law preserves 
it. Similarly, when lawmakers claim to protect women’s health, leg-
islators should explain the precise benefit that a law will achieve.  
This requirement is reconcilable with the Court’s past decisions. 
In Gonzales, for example, Congress did not clearly define fetal dig-
nity.448 Nonetheless, as the Court noted, Congress did explain why 
a ban on dilation and extraction—as opposed to any other abortion 
procedure—raised special concern about fetal dignity.449 Similarly, 
in Whole Woman’s Health, the Court defined the relevant govern-
ment interests with specificity: rather than examining an abstract in-
terest in women’s health, for example, the Court considered whether 
an admitting-privilege requirement would make it easier for women 
to receive appropriate hospital care.450  
Next, courts should apply a three-part test to gauge the strength 
of a statute’s purpose, examining: (1) whether a law addresses an 
identifiable problem; (2) whether the law improves on the results 
achieved by previous policies; and (3) whether the law has some 
quantifiable (if not numerically specific) benefit. These require-
ments crystallize analysis already at work in Casey and its prog-
eny.451 How might they apply in practice?  
                                                                                                         
 448  See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145–47 (2007). 
 449  See id. 
 450  See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2311–13. 
 451  See Ziegler, Liberty and the Politics of Balance, supra note 66, at 463–467. 
134 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:78 
First consider the requirement of an identifiable problem. In 
some cases, application of this requirement will be straightforward. 
When lawmakers claim that a law protects women from the psycho-
logical consequences of abortion, for example, the frequency and 
severity of post-abortion psychological sequelae should be measur-
able. In other instances, when lawmakers claim a more abstract in-
terest, such as protecting fetal dignity, it might be harder to docu-
ment the problem that lawmakers set out to solve. As an initial mat-
ter, lawmakers should explain how fetal dignity has been disre-
spected beyond the fact that abortion—which the Court still treats 
as a protected liberty—is legal. Lawmakers should also provide ex-
amples of when and how members of the public, physicians, or other 
relevant constituencies have demonstrated disrespect for fetal life. 
Requiring legislators to identify a problem will help courts distin-
guish laws with a legitimate purpose from those prohibited by Ca-
sey.452 
Next, courts should examine whether a law improves on the re-
sult achieved by previously-implemented policies. Any abortion 
regulation could arguably enhance respect for fetal dignity. But Ca-
sey and Whole Woman’s Health emphasize a balance between 
women’s protected liberty and the government’s interest in fetal 
life.453 Allowing states to justify any abortion regulation by pointing 
to an interest in fetal dignity would eviscerate this balance. By con-
trast, mandating that the government explain how a law adds value, 
compared to previously implemented abortion regulations, will help 
courts distinguish laws that effectively advance a valid purpose.  
Take, as an example, a ban on D&E or dismemberment abortion. 
D&E may be considered as gruesome as D&X.454 Abortion oppo-
nents claim that such a law advances an interest in fetal dignity be-
cause D&E is especially gruesome.455 But lawmakers and abortion 
opponents have not explained how D&E is especially likely, com-
pared to other abortion procedures, to undermine respect for fetal 
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life or affect attitudes toward fetal life.456 By contrast, in Gonzales, 
the Court emphasized details about partial-birth abortion that made 
it resemble normal delivery.457 For this reason, D&X raised special 
concerns not associated with other abortions.458 No similar argu-
ment seems to apply to bans on D&E.459  
Finally, courts should demand proof that a law has some quan-
tifiable benefit. This benefit need not be a specific number of people 
benefitted by a law, but lawmakers should have the burden of 
demonstrating a concrete benefit. If a benefit is too abstract for 
courts to meaningfully measure, the balance commanded by Casey 
will almost certainly be at risk.460  
How could the government quantify the benefit that a statute de-
livers? Consider one of the latest mandatory-counseling laws, re-
quiring women to receive information about the possibility of re-
versing medication abortion.461 Those backing these laws empha-
size that they protect women who regret having an abortion after 
taking part of a two-drug protocol often required for medication 
abortion.462 To quantify the benefit provided by such a law, lawmak-
ers should bring forth evidence that medication abortion is reversi-
ble. Legislators should also have some evidence—ideally peer-re-
viewed studies—indicating that a reasonable number of women re-
gret choosing medication abortion and would benefit from a reversal 
procedure if an effective one existed. If no such evidence exists, as 
some researchers suggest, then such a law has no legitimate pur-
pose.463  
What about more abstract goals, like enhancing respect for fetal 
life? It may be impossible to document that a law has a positive ef-
fect on attitudes about fetal dignity. How would lawmakers know if 
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prior to the enactment of a law, people viewed fetal life with disre-
spect? And how could legislators demonstrate that a statute reshaped 
anyone’s views? It may be possible for lawmakers to explain more 
precisely what respect for fetal life means and how it could be eval-
uated. If so, requiring some quantification of a benefit would ensure 
that legislators do not simply claim an abstract goal to cover up an 
impermissible purpose, such as discrimination against women or a 
desire to obstruct abortion access. If lawmakers cannot find a way 
to measure the benefit of a law when it comes to respect for life, then 
courts should factor the lack of a proven benefit into the balancing 
that Casey commands.464  
We can get a better sense of this analysis of Casey’s purpose 
prong by applying it to current legislation. Those promoting twenty-
week bans claim that such laws prevent fetal pain and thereby en-
hance respect for fetal life.465 Courts would begin by asking law-
makers to define their purported interest with as much specificity as 
possible; rather than referring to hard-to-pin-down ideas about dig-
nity, legislators would claim an interest in preventing fetal pain.  
Next, a court would determine whether twenty-week bans solve 
a documentable problem. Evidence on the existence of fetal pain at 
or before the twentieth week of pregnancy is contested.466 Pain re-
ceptors are present at this point in pregnancy, and as a result, some 
researchers argue that fetal pain is possible by the twentieth week.467 
Most published studies argue that other requirements for the experi-
ence of fetal pain do not develop until later in pregnancy, and the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists has con-
cluded that fetal pain is not possible as early as twenty weeks’ ges-
tation.468 At best, the evidence regarding the possibility of fetal pain 
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is disputed, and so courts would regard the problem supposedly 
solved by twenty-week bans as questionable. 
Even if such a law did address a real problem, courts would ask 
whether a twenty-week ban improved on the result achieved by pre-
viously implemented laws and whether such a law had a quantifiable 
benefit. Many states ban or heavily regulate abortions later in preg-
nancy, at or near the time of viability, when fetal pain is more 
likely.469 Other states, like Utah, require fetal anesthesia.470 Given 
the weak evidence supporting fetal pain at twenty weeks, it is not 
clear that twenty-week bans add significant value compared to ex-
isting regulations of later abortions.471  
After applying this analysis of a law’s purpose, a court would 
consider the effect of a law under Casey. Only slightly more than 
one percent of women have abortions after the twentieth week.472 
But as Casey and Whole Woman’s Health reason, the question is 
how a law impacts the women most directly affected by a law.473 
For these women, a twenty-week ban would eliminate access to 
abortion altogether before viability—the endpoint recognized by 
Casey.474 Given a state’s relatively weak interest in preventing pain 
and the severe effect such a law would have on the women directly 
affected by a twenty-week ban, a court would likely strike down a 
fetal-pain law.  
Laws regulating the disposal of fetal remains would present a 
closer case.475 On one hand, it would be hard for lawmakers to ex-
plain with adequate specificity what the purpose of such a law would 
be or to provide concrete evidence that such a law would advance 
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that interest. On the other hand, lawmakers could argue that man-
dating the burial or cremation of fetal remains would improve on 
what the law previously allowed—the treatment of fetal remains as 
medical waste.476 In Gonzales, the Court recognized an interest in 
protecting respect for life partly because dilation and extraction 
seemed more likely to coarsen attitudes toward fetal life than com-
parable alternatives that did not resemble ordinary childbirth.477 
Lawmakers might similarly be able to explain how the treatment of 
fetal remains as medical waste is especially problematic. Much will 
depend on whether lawmakers can define an interest clearly enough 
and provide some proof that a change in the law will enhance respect 
for fetal life. Those challenging such laws have argued that they 
raise the cost of an abortion by requiring abortion clinics to under-
take costly burial or cremation procedures.478 If the government can-
not adequately describe the benefit provided by such a law, it might 
be unconstitutional as well.479 
CONCLUSION 
Some of the inconsistency defining the Court’s abortion juris-
prudence stems from the shifting treatment of the justification for 
abortion regulations. The Court has wavered in its willingness to 
recognize new rationales for restricting abortion and its tendency to 
broaden existing interests. This incoherence has real stakes for rights 
involved in the abortion conflict. Pro-life incrementalists have 
championed new legislative interests to allow lawmakers to ban 
abortion earlier in pregnancy, to covertly reshape the Court’s view 
of fetal personhood, and to allow for a wider range of regulations.  
Whole Women’s Health does not fully explain how courts should 
evaluate the purpose of abortion regulations. To clarify how judges 
should measure the claimed benefit of a law, the Court should de-
mand more precision when it comes to the problem and solution that 
lawmakers have identified. Anything less will undermine the careful 
balance Casey demands. 
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